

## 8. Contributing Factors: Societal Values

The true believer in Medicine is convinced that, with modern science guarding their well-being, people have opportunities for a happy and healthy life such as they never had before: anyone who would want to leave such a life prematurely must be mad—or bad. In either case, he must be prevented from doing so.

—Thomas Szasz<sup>1</sup>

In a real sense, Aborigines have been invisible. In the areas of civil and human rights, society saw fit, often still sees fit, not to see them. In the domains of land settlement and squatting, of modern mining and development, for purposes of dubious law and alleged order, the exclusion from pubs, clubs and teams, society has seen fit to make them all too visible. Aborigines are simultaneously invisible and ultra-visible.

—Colin Tatz<sup>2</sup>

I wish to focus on some of the values in mainstream society which impinge on, or relate to, the suicides involved in this study. First, the general attitude to suicide—which is so often seen as something catastrophic, a blot or blight on society, offensive to our notions of the sanctity of life, and therefore as something to be addressed urgently by way of improved medical diagnosis and treatment, and by new or better strategies for prevention. Second, the pervasiveness of racism in much of Aboriginal life, a burden that few other sectors or groups in society endure daily. Third, the perpetuation of an attitude of ‘welfare colonialism’, one in which Aborigines—always seen as plural or as a collective—are always dependent on the ministering services of a ‘superior’ society. Fourth, and allied to the third, the seeming contradiction of the ‘disempowerment’ of a people even as government policies aim to ‘empower’ them.

### 1. Attitudes to suicide

Suicide is seen as an indicator of crisis in a society, a serious phenomenon most worthy of our attention. Therefore, broader questions should be asked, such as:

- Is suicide at the summit of all manners of death, requiring the considerable energy and expenditure now involved in prevention strategies?
- Why do we respond to suicide in the way we do?
- Do we see it as a rejection of ‘us’, an affront to a civilisation we prefer to see as capable of offering hope, faith, spirituality, learned optimism, knowledge, technology?
- Is suicide always a medicalised problem, a ‘mental disorder’ which specialists can treat or remedy?
- Is it an act of free will which society does not want the individual to exercise?

- Does life ‘belong’ to society at large rather than to the individual?

It is noteworthy that in the four major professions or areas dealing with suicide, there is suicide prejudice. James Hillman has written an important book, *Suicide and the Soul*. His aim is to examine suicide, not as an exit from life but as an entrance to death. He is searching for a root metaphor befitting an analyst. His concept of soul embraces any of the following: mind, spirit, heart, life, warmth, humanness, personality, individuality, essence, purpose, morality, sin, virtue, wisdom, death, and perhaps God. In his search or struggle for understanding of the soul, he has rejected the ideas about suicide prevention inherent in sociology, law, theology, and medicine. I now summarise his admonitions about the attitudes of these disciplines to suicide.<sup>3</sup>

- For sociology, suicide is always negative. It presents a loosening of the social structure, a weakening of group bonds, and disintegration. ‘As an open enemy of society, suicide must be opposed and prevented ... suicide prevention for sociology means group reinforcement, which of course reinforces the root metaphor of sociology itself.’
- Roman law, church law, and English law declared suicide criminal. Again, Hillman argues, prevention is the main end in view. In law, death is ‘an act of God’ and a ‘*force majeure*’. Durkheim noted that ‘the causes of death are outside rather than within us.’ Thus law recognises death as something from outside. To take one’s own life, to originate death from within, is neither ‘*force majeure*’ nor an ‘act of God’, ‘but a one-sided abrogation of contract’, thus a breach of the law. Western law has judged suicide from the viewpoint that man belongs first to God, then to King, then last to himself. There are many instances of justifiable homicide; however, until very recently, the law prohibited being ‘mine own executioner’. Insanity thus became the only loophole.
- The Abrahamic religions have their root metaphor in Creation: ‘Almighty God created life. It is His’. We are, therefore, not our own makers, and so we ‘cannot take our lives because they are not ours’.
- As to medicine, the root metaphor above and beyond all others, is to ‘promote physical well being, that is, life’. He contends that in the present era it has come to mean not just promotion of life but *the prolonging of life*. Suicide, or the threat of self-death, cries for ‘the immediate action of locks and drugs and constant surveillance—treatment usually reserved for criminals.’ Good life equals more life. The physician, he says, ‘is obliged to postpone death with every weapon he can command’. Suicide is death—the arch-enemy. Accordingly, there can be no objectivity about suicide in the medical approach.

Thomas Szasz, a radical and often disparaged psychiatrist, has long supported Hillman in asking that we re-examine our attitudes to suicide. Al Alvarez, David Lester, and more recently, Mark Williams, have put forward cogent arguments which confront the restricted views of suicide as madness or badness, as being near-criminal, as a condition warranting coercive treatment or special strategies such as prevention agencies. Szasz condemns R. E. Schulman, an American lawyer and psychologist,

who argues that even if a person does not value his life, society does and is entitled to preserve it. Schulman<sup>4</sup> insists that suicide ‘surely falls within the province of the law’: he calls suicide ‘self-murder’.<sup>5</sup> Szasz disapproves of Phillip Solomon for treating the would-be suicide as an unruly child. Solomon wrote that physicians ‘must protect the patient from his own [suicidal] wishes’. Szasz is even harsher on Shneidman, who says that ‘suicide prevention is like fire prevention’, which Szasz contends reduces the would-be suicide ‘to the level of a tree!’ Szasz quotes a telling passage from Stefan Zweig, the renowned Austrian writer and biographer, who committed suicide in 1942. In Zweig’s novella, *Amok*, his protagonist says:

Ah, yes, ‘It’s one’s duty to help.’ That’s your favourite maxim, isn’t it? ... Thank you for your good intentions, but I’d rather be left to myself ... Sir, I won’t trouble you to call, if you don’t mind. Among the ‘rights of man’ there is a right which no one can take away, the right to croak when and where and how one pleases, without a ‘helping hand’.

In citing these authors, I am being neither anti-medicine nor anti-prevention. Rather, I suggest a reconsideration of our approach towards suicide, customarily seen as something so horrific that, even though it occurs far less frequently than other deaths, we have to marshal enormous resources to cope with it, and to prevent it. We label suicide as ‘depression’ in too many cases; suicidal behaviour is not always the domain of ‘mental health’. We need serious reflection on why we react to suicide the way we do, why we perceive youth suicide as more calamitous than, for example, young deaths on motor bikes or in fast cars, or from drug-taking. We need to ask why we continue to be so affronted, or confronted, by those who would rather not be in life.

## 2. Endemic racism

Aboriginal children—unlike disenchanted, dislocated and disaffected non-Aboriginal youth—are socialised from birth to an endemic and all-pervasive racism. Racism means that Aborigines are perceived as different because of their ‘physical’ attributes, such as colour. These differences are equated with social characteristics, such as culture or lifestyle. These physical-social characteristics are considered socially significant. And then, most importantly, the perceiver believes he is therefore *justified* either in having negative attitudes towards people with those physically-based social attributes, or in taking some action against them.

Racism is more than prejudice. The latter is a mind-set, a mere predisposition. In the thirteenth century, St Thomas Aquinas phrased it as ‘thinking ill of others without sufficient warrant’. Racism is prejudice which is acted upon.

In a hostile world, every racial or ethnic minority, every marginalised group in society, learns to cope with an all-pervasive discrimination if they are to survive and flourish. Many racially discriminatory attitudes and practices are passively accepted, absorbed and, in effect, tolerated by the defined group. Other attitudes and practices

are more direct and hurtful, and cannot readily be handled or shrugged off as ‘a fact of life’.

*(i) Employment*

In several of the towns in this study, a number of men in their 40s and 50s talked to us, often with pride and pleasure, about their years of employment as stockmen, sheep-shearers, fencing contractors, vegetable-pickers and cotton-chippers. They tended to see themselves as a dying breed, with few similar options now available to them or to their children. Jobs are now perceived almost exclusively as CDEP occupations, limited by budgets, profit opportunities which may come from good contracts, or by CDEP programs which are often not really work but simply the occupation of time.

Jobs are seen in terms of what is available exclusively within Aboriginal communities, not within the mainstream. While CDEP commends itself as occupation which restores pride and dignity, it has nevertheless a negative value in that it denies people any incentive, and further closes the already limited outside world.

Jobs in towns for young Aboriginal males and females are rare. In 1997, only two Aboriginal girls in Moree had supermarket checkout jobs, and no boys were employed by town enterprises. In Narrabri, an Aboriginal girl could not obtain work experience in a retail shop, the owner confessing (with chagrin) to the girl’s mother, an old school friend, that he would lose customers if the daughter was seen ‘up front’ in the store. In 1997, a bright young man in Gunnedah, with a Higher School Certificate, made 53 unsuccessful job applications. In one coastal town, the meatworks, with a staff of over a thousand, employs only three Aboriginal men. However, the town boasts an Aboriginal watchmaker.

This pattern pervades New South Wales. Employment of Aborigines exposes them to, amongst other things, rejection by non-Aboriginal society. So the Aborigines become reliant on extremely limited opportunities and resources. The only world, outside of the CDEP world, into which Aborigines can move is the sphere of support services—for Aborigines. In our study, there were perhaps 60 men (and two women) employed by the Police Service as ACLOs. The list of people who were interviewed (in Appendix II) shows the available agency employment: land councils, legal aid services, medical services, Aboriginal corporations, mental health units, Aboriginal rehabilitation centres, and so on. While no Aborigines or non-Aborigines could complain about Aboriginal staff servicing their own organisations, it has to be recognised that *that* is the only service employment available to them. Exclusions and restrictions, once enforced by law, have been maintained, albeit through social attitudes.

Earlier in this report, I wrote that unemployment and unemployment benefits are a norm in Aboriginal life. These financial benefits do not remove the feelings of alienation and exclusion among Aboriginal youth. They see themselves as unwanted in mainstream Australian society. And even though there is group ‘togetherness’ in this sense of rejection, and a degree of social integration in being a band of unemployed or

unemployable youth, there is still the overwhelming Durkheimian sense of social isolation.

*(ii) Housing*

Without exception, every town in this study had a shortage of Aboriginal housing. Every informant insisted that real estate agents discriminated against prospective Aboriginal tenants. A few agents denied this, and when I published a newspaper feature in December 1997 which referred to this, I received several long letters of ‘correction’ and denunciation from aggrieved townspeople. [There are ways in which housing discrimination can be empirically tested, but this must be left to others.] Because the Aboriginal evidence was often highly specific as to names, places and date, my disposition is to accept it.

Housing has always been an acute problem. Aboriginal housing authorities and funding bodies really do not know how many people to cater for. Available houses are constructed as standard, western homes, predicated on nuclear families of one set of parents and perhaps three children. Rarely have projects encompassed the structure of extended Aboriginal family life. Overcrowding, lack of privacy (such as a desk at which to study), and lack of personal space produce an element of ‘claustrophobia’. Certainly, as the young people insist, it produces a need for space—which means the streets.

*(iii) Sport*

Elsewhere I have discussed the importance of sport in Aboriginal life, arguing that sport is more essential in sustaining Aboriginal life than it is in non-Aboriginal society.<sup>6</sup> Sport has also been a major factor in reducing Aboriginal juvenile delinquency: where there is active competition, and access to it, delinquency declines. In the absence of competition, delinquency escalates quite markedly.<sup>7</sup>

Sport is relevant to the suicide pattern, in the sense that it is purposive and purposeful. It has simple, clear goals; it has well-worn and well-known methods of achieving them; it has inbuilt mechanisms for belonging, for loyalty and for treating disloyalty; it has uniforms which signify true membership and equality; it has elaborate ritual and its own special idiom; it has support groups, fans, audiences; it has, always, the promise of rewards at best, of improvement at least. In 1995, I wrote that the Wilcannia Boomerangs and their victories provided some kind of *raison d’être* in a town where purposelessness and meaninglessness pervade.

My 1994 sport–delinquency study discussed the absence of sporting facilities and lack of access to organised competition in many communities. I drew attention to the relative absence of delinquency and suicidal behaviours in towns with active sport: in particular, Nguuu (Bathurst Island) and Barunga (Bamyili) in the Northern Territory; Port Lincoln and Gerard in South Australia; Cherbourg in Queensland; and Condobolin in New South Wales. However, despite increased attention to Aboriginal sport by the

Australian Sports Commission—which has effectively taken over sports funding from ATSIC—there has been a marked regression since my 1989–91 fieldwork.

Facilities in towns vary. The Gingie Reserve near Walgett has an ‘oval’ covered in scrub, with no goalposts; Moree has the use, for a large leasing fee, of an oval with lights. Grounds, equipment and travel money are hard to come by, and expensive, but the most serious problem of all is lack of opponents. The exclusion of the Australian football team, Coomealla, from the Millewa League in 1993 meant that Aborigines in the Dareton-Wentworth area no longer had competition sport. ‘Unduly rough play’ and ‘language’ were cited as reasons for the expulsion. In Bourke, non-Aboriginal youths recently switched from Australian football to rugby union in order to avoid Aborigines. In 1998, the Aboriginal team, which had been expelled from the football league, was readmitted on appeal: whereupon the other teams withdrew from the competition. The [then] local police commander in Bourke guaranteed to meet half the travel costs of these teams, to prevent spectator violence and to ban alcohol from the matches—to no avail. The Moree rugby league has found itself in a similar situation. Sometimes the problem is not this kind of racism but a shortage of resources. In 1997–98, Menindee could not muster a team, which meant that the Group 12 competition, to which they belonged, ceased, leaving Wilcannia also without sport.

Funding for junior sport is a serious problem. Without exception, parents claimed that the costs of junior sport—for shoes, equipment, travel and registration fees—are beyond their means. Some service personnel claim that since there is money for alcohol, there should be money for sport. There is little point in debating choices: the people spending the money are exercising their preferences, and the money in question is social service benefit money, the bulk of which is unemployment relief, which in turn is deliberately predicated at a rate which is not self-sustaining.

*(iv) The role of Police and Community Youth Clubs*

The newer name for the once popular Police Boys’ Clubs system is Police and Community Youth Clubs, or PCYCs. Most major towns and urban centres have such clubs, until 1999 run by police staff in a separate administrative unit. Most clubs have a staff of two, and operate in buildings ranging from the palatial, as in the ex-Returned Servicemen’s Club building in Port Macquarie, to the cramped and under-equipped. Each club has a board, comprising interested citizens. Sponsorships and donations must be sought, and operational funds raised. The police staff are paid by the Police Service.

I have long been an admirer of the work done by, in my view, under-paid and ill-recognised youth workers. They come to the job with little training and no avenues of promotion. The officer who seeks PCYC work is seen by colleagues to be stepping outside the promotion lines. During my fieldwork, the Police Service commissioned an enquiry into the future of PCYCs. Most staff were jittery about the outcome, fearing the truth of a rumour that they were either to be closed down, or the service operated and staffed solely by civilians. In the end, the decision was that PCYCs would continue

with police staff, but that the officers in each club would come under part of the area or local commander's staff, to be directed as to the time spent in PCYC work or in general police duties.

PCYCs are often 'the only game in town'. Clubs—with staff, gyms, playing areas, equipment, sometimes fields—are open seven days a week, with very small membership fees. The staff are often the closest that Aboriginal youth come to having 'enlightened witnesses' in their lives: people who see them regularly, observe patterns of dysfunctional or reactive behaviour, are aware of their lack of food and their poor health. These clubs are the greatest opportunity for an intimate, non-confrontational interaction between Aboriginal youth and the police. It is a relationship *capable* of producing care and trust, of 'witness' and assistance.

There are, however, negative aspects. Several PCYCs are inappropriately staffed. Some staff are uninterested and bored. Some even dislike Aborigines. Some try hard, but their clubs are in areas remote from Aboriginal living, or in areas where Aborigines feel ill at ease. Some officers have taken their services to a community hall in areas where Aborigines live, as in Tamworth, since the youngsters will not come to them. One former senior PCYC officer, now on general duties in Kempsey, organised a mobile PCYC, a large truck fitted out with movable equipment, and computers on board for driving-licence instruction. The truck moves to where the youth are, and where they are more likely to respond, especially to the 'sausage sizzler' that travels with the unit. Some officers, as in Bathurst, collect the youngsters, provide an early morning meal, deliver them to their schools, and run afternoon homework classes. The Port Macquarie club provides a bag of chips and a sandwich for a dollar and, if payment is not possible, in exchange accepts help in the kitchen.

Some PCYC officers have sought permission to give lectures on suicide to schools. They have been refused, allegedly on the ground that the school has a counsellor on staff, and that to talk openly about suicide 'might put ideas into kids' heads'. The PCYC concept could be the most important agency for monitoring behaviour, mitigating it, and at the same time providing an alternative to the boredom that besets so many youth in country towns. The reality is that most Aboriginal youngsters avoid these clubs, claiming that fees are too high, the premises too far away, and the regimens too formal.

*(v) The attitudes of service personnel*

The people who have most dealings with Aborigines are the police. There is an important historical dimension. The *Aborigines Protection Act 1909* created a Board for the Protection of Aborigines—with the Inspector-General of Police (later, the Commissioner) as chairman *ex officio*. The Board's task was to distribute blankets and food, maintain 'the custody, maintenance and education of children of Aborigines', and 'exercise a general supervision and care over all matters affecting the interests and welfare of Aborigines'. In 1936, 'any Aborigine (or person apparently having an admixture of Aboriginal blood) living, in the Board's opinion, in unsanitary or

undesirable conditions, can be ordered by a stipendiary magistrate to a reserve'. The Act was repealed in 1969. Most of the statutory power to 'supervise', protect, and to remove to reserves, lay with the police.

When 'freedom' came after the repeal of special legislation, and especially after the 1972 federal election, police resented the loss of their role in Aboriginal matters. For nearly two decades, police in general railed against Aboriginal legal aid: here was 'intrusion' into the police domain and 'defiance' of the authoritative and authoritarian police regulation of Aboriginal conduct.

In an ironic sense, little has changed. Police no longer have a formal or statutory role in Aboriginal affairs. Many police officers now co-operate with, and even applaud, the work of legal aid and similar agencies. A remarkable change in police culture has taken place since my first ventures into Aboriginal centres, and even since my 1989–91 fieldwork. The 'new breed' say the right things, for the most part, and often *do* the right things. Officers with inappropriate attitudes remain in some sensitive locations, but there is a much greater sense of police being 'on side'. The irony, as I see it, is that the only people who are available to communities exhibiting distress signals are the police, whom most Aborigines still purport to despise and distrust.

Most police stations operate 24 hours a day, seven days a week. Much of the violence, especially of the domestic kind, occurs over weekends. The only resource people available are police, who need to act as social workers, mediators, confessors, and 'dampeners' where possible. Most police object to these roles, contending that they lack the necessary formal training or skills. Be that as it may, it is the ACLOs who take the burden of this work. It is this body of men and women who suffer gross overload, and are under-rewarded, in salary and status, for the work they do.

The allegation by Aborigines and by police is that the normal 'welfare' agencies—the departments of Community Services, Juvenile Justice, Health, the mental health units—'switch on their answering machines at 4 p.m. on a Friday and switch them off again at 9 a.m. on a Monday'. The proffered justifications are budget restrictions and cuts in overtime, but it leaves the police, especially ACLOs, as the only personnel—apart from ambulance and hospital casualty staff—able to respond to calls for help.

Service providers tend to see Aborigines in the generic plural rather than as singular or individual. 'They', 'them', 'these people'—common phrasings—are treated, not only as being 'different' but as a collective, exhibiting group symptoms and problems and, clearly, requiring 'group solutions'. There are instances of one-on-one relationships, such as in treatment or therapy contexts. A number of such relationships are caring ones, often commented on as such by Aboriginal patients or clients. But there remains a deep-seated and pervasive sense that Aboriginal communities have one set of values, needs, wants, behaviours and responses. The *communitas* model, discussed in chapter 2, is misconceived, inaccurate and inappropriate as a way of proceeding towards strategies in any field, let alone the complex area of suicide.

### 3. 'Disempowerment'

Empowerment means giving someone the authority to act. To 'disempower' is to remove that authorisation. However, it has come to mean that a person has no sense of confidence in his or her ability to make decisions unaided. If power is intended in its political, or Weberian, sense of a person being able to exert his or her will in competition with others, then 'disempowerment' can, at a stretch, be taken to mean 'powerless', or the condition of powerlessness.

In chapter 6, I discussed various categories of suicide which may arise from this sense of powerlessness. The desire or the need to express autonomy, or 'selfhood', for perhaps the only time in their lives—even, or only, by the act of suicide—is a possible explanation for some forms of self-destruction. I also discussed existential suicide, embracing as it does the notion of hopelessness and futility.

In the broader sense, there is communal 'disempowerment'. In the 1960s and early 1970s, the late Professor Charles Rowley and I declared that what Aborigines needed was 'more lawyers and fewer welfare officers'. We meant that legal recourse, to discover and recover rights, was a better avenue than the 'welfare' model, and the best way for Aborigines to go forward was to protect themselves by forming associations or corporations with distinct artificial legal personalities. The legal cocoons provided by incorporation would make the 'naked individuals' less susceptible to treatment meted out by government agencies. Western society has always had greater respect for corporate power than for individual rights. Thus, we argued, there could well be greater respect arising from contests initiated by 'organisation' people rather than from conflicts waged by individual men and women.

From the early 1970s, Aboriginal groups began their systematic incorporation as legal associations. By 1996, the *National Directory of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Organisations* occupied 511 pages, subdividing land rights and councils; community groups; community aid groups; housing and accommodation bodies; women's groups; pre-schools and day-care centres; employment, education and training organisations; and legal and civil rights associations. The *Directory* is incomplete, but New South Wales has at least 108 land councils, 50 community corporations, 62 housing associations, 22 women's group associations, 34 health corporations, 35 pre-school bodies, 43 educational and training associations, and 25 legal aid and/or advice bureaux. A safe figure is 400 corporations, servicing a population of about 109,000 people (producing a somewhat absurd-looking statistic of one corporation per 272 people). These are in addition to the services provided by the regular governmental agencies.

It seems that Rowley and I were wrong in one unexpected sense. The plethora of associations has led, not to 'empowerment', but 'disempowerment'. The associations, albeit with detailed mission statements and articles of incorporation defining their reasons for being, compete for a share of what they call 'the money bucket'. That bucket is finite. Jurisdictions or agendas often overlap. ATSIC and other authorising bodies are reluctant to refuse requests for association status, and all too often one clan

decides it wants to form an association because of factionalism. Either because of unintended and unforeseen reasons, or, as some Aborigines would have it, for 'divide-and-conquer' reasons, these associations can be divisive rather than cohesive, antagonistic rather than co-operative, 'jealousing' rather than moving forward.

The structure of Aboriginal corporate bodies causes additional problems. They are based on a Western, legal template for corporate organisation, with agendas, meetings, quorums, minutes, presidents, vice-presidents, treasurers, auditors. It is alien template that has been imposed, as such structures are rarely consonant with (what were) traditional methods of decision-making. Those in positions of power claim they have neither the time nor the patience to construct more culturally appropriate mechanisms. However, the essentially assimilationist philosophy—which insists that the 'colonised' accommodate to metropolitan models and values—has long bedevilled Aboriginal administration.

Deloria argues that American Indian corporations are the new tribe, one that should aim at ensuring as beneficial a life as possible for its members.<sup>8</sup> He sees it as a 'technical weapon by which Indian revivalism can be accomplished'. Importantly, 'at the same time it is that element of white culture closest to the tribe and can thereby enable it to understand both white and Indian ways of doing business.' Aborigines, like Amerindians, can absorb the corporation 'as a handy tool for its own purposes'. I agree. But the sadness is that most corporations are still too heavily engaged in 'fortress' activity, of meeting deadlines set by white agencies and of beating off financial investigations.

The other sadness is that Aboriginal children are rejecting the corporation life. These are the children whose parents occupy senior, paid positions. These youth are children of *literate* parents: yet many demonstrate their preference for illiteracy, and for *not* following parental footsteps and progress up the mobility ladder. Several young informants said they hatred the in-fighting, the power play, and the internecine strife involved in this corporation world. For these young people, this alien world of power, prestige, income, status and skill is to be avoided.

**Endnotes 8. Contributing Factors: Societal Values**

1. Szasz, 85. Thomas Szasz is a practising psychiatrist and academic in the State University of New York. There is much disapproval of his style, manner, sharp pen and gadfly interests, and there is a great deal of controversy, especially among the more conservative, about his often logical attacks on what he calls 'the theology of medicine'. Szasz has written strongly about medicine's attitude to suicide, and I have come to share some of his values.

2. Tatz, 1995, 24.

3. Hillman, 24–55.

4. Ibid., 70, 78–85.

5. This is interesting terminology: a dozen European languages use variations of the German *selbstmord*, and the Dutch *zelfmoord*. In Afrikaans, the word is *selfmoord*; in Danish and Norse, *selvmord*; in Swedish, *själv mord*; in Serbian, *samebistvon* and in Hungarian, *öngyilkosság*, which is, literally, self-murder.

6. Tatz, 1995, chapter 13, 'Sport and Survival'.

7. Tatz, 1994.

8. Deloria, 230-42.